OpenReception has unauthenticated GLOBAL_ADMIN account creation post-bootstrap
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated POST requests to `/setup/create-admin-account` and creates additional GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts without verifying that an admin already exists. Any unauthenticated network attacker who can submit a same-origin form POST gains full platform-level administrative control. The newly created account is `is_active=true` with `confirmation_state=ACCESS_GRANTED` and does not require completing email confirmation; the GLOBAL_ADMIN row is created active and immediately usable. Login and tenant enumeration succeed without any further interaction. This is distinct from the deployment race condition already documented on the `Claiming an instance` page. That documented race covers the window between deployment and first claim. The bug reported here works after the operator has properly claimed and configured the instance: the layout-level guard that protects the setup page only redirects on GET, while the `default` form action handler creates the user without rechecking `adminExists()`. Three GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts were created in succession during testing, with no rate limiting observed. Audit-specific event logging beyond standard application logs was not assessed; the standard `[error]` line that surfaces only when a uniqueness conflict is hit is not the same as a security event for "additional
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-48085
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 7 Nov 2026, 10:32 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
OpenReception has unauthenticated GLOBAL_ADMIN account creation post-bootstrap
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 6 Aug 2026, 21:29 UTC
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated POST requests to `/setup/create-admin-account` and creates additional GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts without verifying that an admin already exists. Any unauthenticated network attacker who can submit a same-origin form POST gains full platform-level administrative control. The newly created account is `is_active=true` with `confirmation_state=ACCESS_GRANTED` and does not require completing email confirmation; the GLOBAL_ADMIN row is created active and immediately usable. Login and tenant enumeration succeed without any further interaction. This is distinct from the deployment race condition already documented on the `Claiming an instance` page. That documented race covers the window between deployment and first claim. The bug reported here works after the operator has properly claimed and configured the instance: the layout-level guard that protects the setup page only redirects on GET, while the `default` form action handler creates the user without rechecking `adminExists()`. Three GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts were created in succession during testing, with no rate limiting observed. Audit-specific event logging beyond standard application logs was not assessed; the standard `[error]` line that surfaces only when a uniqueness conflict is hit is not the same as a security event for "additional
osv:CVE-2026-48085
Complete source record
{
"id": "d8183149bf2b11574ad305a19039d1d835fef8c0a3bd9a38e360434b0fe79f58",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-48085",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "OpenReception has unauthenticated GLOBAL_ADMIN account creation post-bootstrap",
"summary": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.1, a fully provisioned OpenReception instance accepts unauthenticated POST requests to `/setup/create-admin-account` and creates additional GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts without verifying that an admin already exists. Any unauthenticated network attacker who can submit a same-origin form POST gains full platform-level administrative control. The newly created account is `is_active=true` with `confirmation_state=ACCESS_GRANTED` and does not require completing email confirmation; the GLOBAL_ADMIN row is created active and immediately usable. Login and tenant enumeration succeed without any further interaction. This is distinct from the deployment race condition already documented on the `Claiming an instance` page. That documented race covers the window between deployment and first claim. The bug reported here works after the operator has properly claimed and configured the instance: the layout-level guard that protects the setup page only redirects on GET, while the `default` form action handler creates the user without rechecking `adminExists()`. Three GLOBAL_ADMIN accounts were created in succession during testing, with no rate limiting observed. Audit-specific event logging beyond standard application logs was not assessed; the standard `[error]` line that surfaces only when a uniqueness conflict is hit is not the same as a security event for \"additional ",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-48085",
"products": [],
"severity": "critical",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-48085",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48085",
"GHSA-qvvq-hhpj-64rp"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "222408af6fd4bd85554a25ec8de8131bd0733797"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.1"
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],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "222408af6fd4bd85554a25ec8de8131bd0733797"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.1"
}
],
"source": "DESCRIPTION"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v1.0.0",
"v1.0.0-rc2",
"v1.0.0-rc"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-48085.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:50.395493751Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48085.json",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-qvvq-hhpj-64rp",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48085",
"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/222408af6fd4bd85554a25ec8de8131bd0733797"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48085.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-48085",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 519012,
"published_at": "2026-08-06T21:29:00.382+00:00"
}