Malicious code in xcvrenzcompany (npm)
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., "base64")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in `engine-requirements.js`), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the
- Products
- xcvrenzcompany
- Affected versions
- 1.0.0, 2.0.0
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- Not specified
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 07:26 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., "base64")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in `engine-requirements.js`), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the
osv:MAL-2026-17452
xcvrenzcompany
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "2d7d674e741ab85c41247cde917adb187ab501ce02e0e8da929fc7c5238e2afa",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17452",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Malicious code in xcvrenzcompany (npm)",
"summary": "This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the \"PhantomSub\" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID. `package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js` lines 62-99 define `AUTO_FOLLOW_JIDS`, three base64 strings decoded with `Buffer.from(..., \"base64\")`, and when the connection opens (line 97) schedule a FOLLOW query for each, 90 seconds apart (cited line 85: `await newsletterWMexQuery(jid, QueryIds.FOLLOW);`). Decoded JIDs: `120363400505489366@newsletter`, `120363430764800148@newsletter` and `120363387182851100@newsletter`. There is no opt-out and the behavior is not documented. The npm maintainer account (`xzv-expzc`) also publishes `prastzy`. Line numbers refer to version 2.0.0; the same code is present in every published version listed under `affected`. Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in `engine-requirements.js`), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the",
"evidence": "osv:MAL-2026-17452",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "xcvrenzcompany",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": [
{
"value": "1.0.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "2.0.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
}
]
}
],
"severity": "unknown",
"structured": {
"id": "MAL-2026-17452",
"aliases": [
"GHSA-5f99-96jc-hg98",
"MAL-2026-17452"
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "xcvrenzcompany",
"purl": "pkg:npm/xcvrenzcompany",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"2.0.0"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code",
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature."
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/xcvrenzcompany/MAL-2026-17452.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T07:00:06.070389235Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/",
"https://www.npmjs.com/package/xcvrenzcompany",
"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5f99-96jc-hg98"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"iocs": {
"files": [
{
"note": "File containing the injected WhatsApp Channel follow code.",
"paths": [
"package/lib/Socket/newsletter.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE",
"digests": {
"sha256": "be5af2eac1d0d405c2bbf1ec1fd57f96695ddf5bd7ce2b5d3117017bfa608ba8"
}
}
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "GHSA-5f99-96jc-hg98",
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
]
}
],
"sha256": "faf45b23cb039efe4bf23bfa7c70311bc8167d6db9ba7e763ee14ee5322902c5",
"source": "ghsa-malware",
"import_time": "2026-10-19T06:51:37.779727581Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-19T06:22:46Z"
}
]
}
},
"related_cves": [],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": null
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 372314,
"published_at": "2026-10-19T06:22:45+00:00"
}