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HighFix available

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

Type: advisorySources: OSV

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob who

Products
gix-worktree
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
0.34.0
CVEs
CVE-2024-35186
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
30 Oct 2026, 08:43 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

core-osv · Original source

Published 22 May 2024, 12:00 UTC

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob who

osv:RUSTSEC-2024-0349

gix-worktree

Fixed versions: 0.34.0

Complete source record
{
  "id": "657e4027d7ac7590676eb8758d77f3f7024f0062d26fe482d5f0b2c05b02b977",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2024-0349",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution",
    "summary": "### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob who",
    "evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2024-0349",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "gix-worktree",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.34.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "RUSTSEC-2024-0349",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2024-35186",
        "GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c",
        "RUSTSEC-2024-0348",
        "RUSTSEC-2024-0349",
        "RUSTSEC-2024-0350"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.34.0"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "gix-worktree",
            "purl": "pkg:cargo/gix-worktree",
            "ecosystem": "crates.io"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2024-0349.json",
            "categories": [
              "code-execution"
            ],
            "informational": null
          },
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "affects": {
              "os": [],
              "arch": [],
              "functions": []
            },
            "affected_functions": null
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-12T18:00:06.813251209Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://crates.io/crates/gix-worktree",
        "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0349.html",
        "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/commit/79dce79c62f6072aa2653780d590dc3993dfa401",
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35186"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "license": "CC0-1.0"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2024-35186",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 306371,
  "published_at": "2024-05-22T12:00:00+00:00"
}