Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments
Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin. This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server. This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded
- Products
- pingora-proxy
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.9.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-105299
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 1 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 20 Oct 2026, 12:00 UTC
Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin. This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server. This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded
osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0390
pingora-proxy
Fixed versions: 0.9.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "79de119c24c4a33e1fd72a345e7694e15046111b88505b43979fea3f1d8f389d",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0390",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments",
"summary": "Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin. This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server. This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded",
"evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0390",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "pingora-proxy",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.9.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0390",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-105299",
"GHSA-vx4q-2c55-cvmg",
"RUSTSEC-2026-0390"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "pingora-proxy",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/pingora-proxy",
"ecosystem": "crates.io"
},
"database_specific": {
"cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0390.json",
"categories": [],
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affects": {
"os": [],
"arch": [],
"functions": []
},
"affected_functions": null
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-26T11:15:11.361865763Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://crates.io/crates/pingora-proxy",
"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0390.html",
"https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded",
"https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-105299",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 450320,
"published_at": "2026-10-20T12:00:00+00:00"
}