LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files
## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *
- Products
- loopx
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.4.5
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-108372
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:18 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 19 Oct 2026, 16:11 UTC
## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *
osv:GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q
loopx
Fixed versions: 0.4.5
Complete source record
{
"id": "f475cb66dec5c0bbe23e79f8c83e5ae8237f4d9c2327819b0ab175786a4cfae2",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files",
"summary": "## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "loopx",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.4.5",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-108372",
"GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.5"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "loopx",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/loopx",
"ecosystem": "PyPI"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T16:15:43.737645560Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/huangruiteng/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
"https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108372",
"https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/pull/3137",
"https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/commit/838720fba42bd22f71b5bb763ec406f7bdf4c940",
"https://github.com/huangruiteng/loopx",
"https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/releases/tag/v0.4.5"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-942"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T22:17:14Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-19T16:11:57Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-108372",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 375335,
"published_at": "2026-10-19T16:11:57+00:00"
}