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LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *

Products
loopx
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
0.4.5
CVEs
CVE-2026-108372
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 08:18 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files

core-osv · Original source

Published 19 Oct 2026, 16:11 UTC

## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *

osv:GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q

loopx

Fixed versions: 0.4.5

Complete source record
{
  "id": "f475cb66dec5c0bbe23e79f8c83e5ae8237f4d9c2327819b0ab175786a4cfae2",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "LoopX serve-status permissive CORS policy exposes control-plane state and private Markdown files",
    "summary": "## Summary `loopx serve-status` sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on **every** response, including its unauthenticated `GET` routes. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated and bound to a fixed, well-known loopback port, **any website the operator visits can read LoopX control-plane state and the contents of Markdown files inside every registered goal repo**, using a plain `fetch()` with no user interaction. The write endpoints are *not* affected — they are correctly Origin-checked. This report is strictly about the **read** paths. ## Impact While `loopx serve-status` is running, a page on any origin can run: ```js // no interaction, no preflight, no credentials needed const s = await (await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8766/status.json')).json(); for (const g of s.goals ?? []) { const m = await (await fetch( `http://127.0.0.1:8766/review-material?goal_id=${g.id}&path=design-notes.md` )).json(); exfiltrate(m.content); } ``` and read back: * **`GET /status.json`** — the whole status projection: goal ids, run history, and local absolute paths (`registry`, `runtime_root`). With `--global-registry` this covers **every project registered on the machine**, not just one. * **`GET /review-material?goal_id=…&path=…`** — the *content* of any `.md`/`.markdown` file under a goal's repo root, state dir, or runtime dir. In practice that is the operator's private design notes, handoff docs, and evidence write-ups. * **`GET /`** — endpoint discovery, including which write APIs are enabled. *",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "loopx",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.4.5",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-108372",
        "GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V4",
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.0.1"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.4.5"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "loopx",
            "purl": "pkg:pypi/loopx",
            "ecosystem": "PyPI"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-19T16:15:43.737645560Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/huangruiteng/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
        "https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2m-gpq4-8j5q",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108372",
        "https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/pull/3137",
        "https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/commit/838720fba42bd22f71b5bb763ec406f7bdf4c940",
        "https://github.com/huangruiteng/loopx",
        "https://github.com/loopx-project/loopx/releases/tag/v0.4.5"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-346",
          "CWE-942"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T22:17:14Z",
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-19T16:11:57Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-108372",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 375335,
  "published_at": "2026-10-19T16:11:57+00:00"
}