PinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-33621
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 5 Nov 2026, 05:36 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
PinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 26 Mar 2026, 20:42 UTC
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even
osv:CVE-2026-33621
Complete source record
{
"id": "7a22659f1b2cd1769306b260eb3acf7c5aea0a74dea60febf11d2ee58d594cb1",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33621",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "PinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token",
"summary": "PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-33621",
"products": [],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-33621",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33621",
"GHSA-j65m-hv65-r264",
"GO-2026-4821"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"repo": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab",
"type": "GIT",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3b64a0565d1c4b7118da7b3912f0316775097240"
},
{
"fixed": "ce7efa1c3d564cafcf094fcdbd22ffdd7863e71d"
},
{
"fixed": "c619c43a4f29d1d1a481e859c193baf78e0d648b"
},
{
"fixed": "60ce4448c30d3c68edf790875bc1167d7a7b2308"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"extracted_events": [
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.7.7"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.5"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "c619c43a4f29d1d1a481e859c193baf78e0d648b"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "60ce4448c30d3c68edf790875bc1167d7a7b2308"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
"original_tag": "v0.8.4"
}
]
}
}
],
"versions": [
"v0.8.3",
"v0.8.2",
"v0.8.1",
"v0.8.0",
"v0.7.8",
"v0.7.7"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-33621.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:42.953025507Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag/v0.8.4",
"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33621.json",
"https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-j65m-hv65-r264",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33621",
"https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/commit/c619c43a4f29d1d1a481e859c193baf78e0d648b"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-770"
],
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33621.json"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-33621",
"evidence": "/id"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 510751,
"published_at": "2026-03-26T20:42:12.692+00:00"
}