react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS
### Summary `React\Http\Browser` and its lower-level HTTP stack impose no limit on the size of a response's header section while it is being received. `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` appends every incoming byte to an internal buffer and only scans that buffer for the `\r\n\r\n` (or `\n\n`) terminator, without ever checking its length. A remote server that withholds the terminator and keeps streaming can grow the client's memory without bound until PHP's `memory_limit` is exhausted and the process crashes. This is an unauthenticated, network-reachable denial of service against any application that uses `react/http` as a client to fetch untrusted or attacker-influenced URLs, including via redirects. ### Details `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` is bound directly to the underlying connection's `data` event, so every byte the peer sends is appended with no size check: ```php public function handleData($data) { $this->buffer .= $data; // buffer until double CRLF (or double LF for compatibility with legacy servers) $eom = \strpos($this->buffer, "\r\n\r\n"); $eomLegacy = \strpos($this->buffer, "\n\n"); if ($eom !== false || $eomLegacy !== false) { ``` The only exit from the buffering state is finding the header terminator or a connection close, so until it arrives the buffer grows monotonically for as long as the peer keeps sending. The codebase already applies this class of limit elsewhere, but not symmetrically. `RequestHeaderParser` caps incoming **request** headers when ac
- Products
- react/http
- Affected versions
- v1.0.0, v1.1.0, v1.10.0, v1.11.0, v1.2.0, v1.3.0, v1.4.0, v1.5.0, v1.6.0, v1.7.0, v1.8.0, v1.9.0
- Fixed versions
- 1.11.1
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-104827
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 30 Oct 2026, 19:14 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 15 Oct 2026, 20:09 UTC
### Summary `React\Http\Browser` and its lower-level HTTP stack impose no limit on the size of a response's header section while it is being received. `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` appends every incoming byte to an internal buffer and only scans that buffer for the `\r\n\r\n` (or `\n\n`) terminator, without ever checking its length. A remote server that withholds the terminator and keeps streaming can grow the client's memory without bound until PHP's `memory_limit` is exhausted and the process crashes. This is an unauthenticated, network-reachable denial of service against any application that uses `react/http` as a client to fetch untrusted or attacker-influenced URLs, including via redirects. ### Details `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` is bound directly to the underlying connection's `data` event, so every byte the peer sends is appended with no size check: ```php public function handleData($data) { $this->buffer .= $data; // buffer until double CRLF (or double LF for compatibility with legacy servers) $eom = \strpos($this->buffer, "\r\n\r\n"); $eomLegacy = \strpos($this->buffer, "\n\n"); if ($eom !== false || $eomLegacy !== false) { ``` The only exit from the buffering state is finding the header terminator or a connection close, so until it arrives the buffer grows monotonically for as long as the peer keeps sending. The codebase already applies this class of limit elsewhere, but not symmetrically. `RequestHeaderParser` caps incoming **request** headers when ac
osv:GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj
react/http
Fixed versions: 1.11.1
Complete source record
{
"id": "0cd478e5727c1de70ed60a88dabcd40e8e26cbe94131c307fc51bc93816bafc0",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS",
"summary": "### Summary `React\\Http\\Browser` and its lower-level HTTP stack impose no limit on the size of a response's header section while it is being received. `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` appends every incoming byte to an internal buffer and only scans that buffer for the `\\r\\n\\r\\n` (or `\\n\\n`) terminator, without ever checking its length. A remote server that withholds the terminator and keeps streaming can grow the client's memory without bound until PHP's `memory_limit` is exhausted and the process crashes. This is an unauthenticated, network-reachable denial of service against any application that uses `react/http` as a client to fetch untrusted or attacker-influenced URLs, including via redirects. ### Details `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` is bound directly to the underlying connection's `data` event, so every byte the peer sends is appended with no size check: ```php public function handleData($data) { $this->buffer .= $data; // buffer until double CRLF (or double LF for compatibility with legacy servers) $eom = \\strpos($this->buffer, \"\\r\\n\\r\\n\"); $eomLegacy = \\strpos($this->buffer, \"\\n\\n\"); if ($eom !== false || $eomLegacy !== false) { ``` The only exit from the buffering state is finding the header terminator or a connection close, so until it arrives the buffer grows monotonically for as long as the peer keeps sending. The codebase already applies this class of limit elsewhere, but not symmetrically. `RequestHeaderParser` caps incoming **request** headers when ac",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "react/http",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
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"value": "1.11.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": [
{
"value": "v1.0.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "v1.1.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "v1.10.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "v1.11.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "v1.2.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "v1.3.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
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{
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"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
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{
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{
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"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
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"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
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{
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{
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]
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104827",
"GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
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{
"fixed": "1.11.1"
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]
}
],
"package": {
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"purl": "pkg:composer/react/http",
"ecosystem": "Packagist"
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"versions": [
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"v1.1.0",
"v1.10.0",
"v1.11.0",
"v1.2.0",
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"v1.6.0",
"v1.7.0",
"v1.8.0",
"v1.9.0"
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"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj/GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.11.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:30:06.075181740Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/reactphp/http/security/advisories/GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj",
"https://github.com/reactphp/http/commit/2558622d0b76227c60c61eac8a61572cb6638e8c",
"https://github.com/reactphp/http",
"https://github.com/reactphp/http/releases/tag/v1.11.1"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
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"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:09:56Z"
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},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-104827",
"evidence": "/aliases"
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"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 336049,
"published_at": "2026-10-15T20:09:56+00:00"
}