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adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `"error"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on("error", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `"error"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs

Products
adm-zip
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
0.6.1
CVEs
CVE-2026-114102
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)

core-osv · Original source

Published 29 Sept 2026, 23:10 UTC

## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `"error"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on("error", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `"error"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs

osv:GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374

adm-zip

Fixed versions: 0.6.1

Complete source record
{
  "id": "b7f2aaf7f4471fa3f91457d34b5b2abe23a5a4e4b1e4af90ee583543ab109f98",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)",
    "summary": "## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `\"error\"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on(\"data\", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on(\"end\", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on(\"error\", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `\"error\"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "adm-zip",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.6.1",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-114102",
        "GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.6.1"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "adm-zip",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/adm-zip",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374.json",
            "last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.6.0"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:20.841093060Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/security/advisories/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
        "https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/commit/5e70d3a26097d68fa981c41f022c053117174e49",
        "https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip",
        "https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/releases/tag/v0.6.1"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-248",
          "CWE-400"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": null,
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T23:10:09Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-114102",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 392974,
  "published_at": "2026-09-29T23:10:09+00:00"
}