adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)
## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `"error"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on("error", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `"error"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs
- Products
- adm-zip
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 0.6.1
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-114102
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 29 Sept 2026, 23:10 UTC
## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `"error"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on("error", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `"error"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs
osv:GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374
adm-zip
Fixed versions: 0.6.1
Complete source record
{
"id": "b7f2aaf7f4471fa3f91457d34b5b2abe23a5a4e4b1e4af90ee583543ab109f98",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)",
"summary": "## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `\"error\"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on(\"data\", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on(\"end\", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on(\"error\", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `\"error\"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAs",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "adm-zip",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.6.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114102",
"GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.1"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "adm-zip",
"purl": "pkg:npm/adm-zip",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.6.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:20.841093060Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/security/advisories/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374",
"https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/commit/5e70d3a26097d68fa981c41f022c053117174e49",
"https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip",
"https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/releases/tag/v0.6.1"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-400"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T23:10:09Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-114102",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 392974,
"published_at": "2026-09-29T23:10:09+00:00"
}