Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
High

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

Type: advisorySources: OSV

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a f

Products
Not specified
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
Not specified
CVEs
CVE-2026-115477
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
7 Nov 2026, 17:23 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

core-osv · Original source

Published 23 Oct 2026, 14:04 UTC

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a f

osv:CVE-2026-115477
Complete source record
{
  "id": "b3dd0a4c3576e8fb5b5f2130dba08f8da638d1d557aa7548a2b3c3128b107d5a",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-115477",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP",
    "summary": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a f",
    "evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-115477",
    "products": [],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "CVE-2026-115477",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-115477",
        "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V4",
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "repo": "https://github.com/the-40-thieves/obsidian-tc",
              "type": "GIT",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "edccf949f256ab96adbd85098fb591a846d0f433"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "b2b34c996f8cbcbc4f78121c14d0502e59673193"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
                }
              ],
              "database_specific": {
                "extracted_events": [
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "introduced": "1.13.0"
                      },
                      {
                        "fixed": "1.31.4"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
                    "strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
                  },
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "fixed": "101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
                  },
                  {
                    "range": [
                      {
                        "fixed": "b2b34c996f8cbcbc4f78121c14d0502e59673193"
                      }
                    ],
                    "source": "REFERENCES_TAG",
                    "original_tag": "v1.31.4"
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          ],
          "versions": [
            "v1.31.3",
            "1.31.3",
            "v1.31.2",
            "1.31.2",
            "v1.31.1",
            "1.31.1",
            "v1.31.0",
            "1.31.0",
            "v1.30.1",
            "1.30.1",
            "v1.30.0",
            "1.30.0",
            "v1.29.0",
            "1.29.0",
            "v1.28.4",
            "1.28.4",
            "v1.28.3",
            "1.28.3",
            "v1.28.2",
            "1.28.2",
            "v1.28.1",
            "1.28.1",
            "v1.28.0",
            "1.28.0",
            "v1.27.0",
            "1.27.0",
            "v1.26.0",
            "v1.25.0",
            "v1.24.0",
            "v1.23.6",
            "v1.23.5",
            "v1.23.4",
            "v1.23.3",
            "v1.23.2",
            "v1.23.1",
            "v1.23.0",
            "v1.22.0",
            "v1.21.0",
            "v1.20.0",
            "v1.19.0",
            "v1.18.0",
            "v1.17.1",
            "v1.17.0",
            "v1.16.0",
            "v1.15.0",
            "v1.14.3",
            "v1.14.2",
            "v1.14.1",
            "v1.14.0",
            "v1.13.1",
            "v1.13.0"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-115477.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-31T02:30:55.357524785Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
        "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/115xxx/CVE-2026-115477.json",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115477",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
        "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-285",
          "CWE-863"
        ],
        "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
        "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/115xxx/CVE-2026-115477.json"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-115477",
        "evidence": "/id"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 519970,
  "published_at": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518+00:00"
}