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identrail: Cross-tenant GitHub installation binding without ownership verification

Type: advisorySources: Official CVE List

identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.

Products
identrail
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
Not specified
CVEs
CVE-2026-59185
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
1 Nov 2026, 17:17 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

identrail: Cross-tenant GitHub installation binding without ownership verification

core-cve · Original source

Published 28 Oct 2026, 13:15 UTC

identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.

cve:CVE-2026-59185

identrail

Fixed versions: Not specified

Complete source record
{
  "id": "675cfe62118f2af1caf4ed511e631f4b56b52d3654f549befdc9295e7d2c4f03",
  "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59185",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "identrail: Cross-tenant GitHub installation binding without ownership verification",
    "summary": "identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete` endpoint in `internal/api/router.go` accepts `installation_id` from the request body or `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. `CompleteGitHubConnection` in `internal/api/github_connect.go` rigorously binds `state` to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. `ListInstallationRepositories` in `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go` invokes token creation through `internal/connectors/github/app.go` and `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens`, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 `CompleteGitHubConnector` path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending `state` without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.",
    "evidence": "cve:CVE-2026-59185",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "identrail",
          "evidence": "/containers/cna/affected/0/product"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "CVE-2026-59185",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-59185"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "version": "3.1",
            "baseScore": 8.5,
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "identrail",
          "product": "identrail",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "< 1.0.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-28T16:07:10.634Z",
      "provider": "cve",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5",
        "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7",
        "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "adp": [
          {
            "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
            "metrics": [
              {
                "other": {
                  "type": "ssvc",
                  "content": {
                    "id": "CVE-2026-59185",
                    "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                    "options": [
                      {
                        "Exploitation": "none"
                      },
                      {
                        "Automatable": "no"
                      },
                      {
                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                      }
                    ],
                    "version": "2.0.3",
                    "timestamp": "2026-10-28T14:37:16.463171Z"
                  }
                }
              }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
              "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
              "shortName": "CISA-ADP",
              "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T16:07:10.634Z"
            }
          }
        ],
        "cna": {
          "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
          "shortName": "GitHub_M",
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T13:15:53.456Z"
        }
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-59185",
        "evidence": "/cveMetadata/cveId"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/containers/cna/metrics"
  },
  "source_id": "core-cve",
  "document_id": 460276,
  "published_at": "2026-10-28T13:15:53.456+00:00"
}