Vikunja: API token scopes bypassed via task expand parameter (comments, reactions, time entry counts)
## Summary API token permission checks only match the HTTP method and route path. The `expand` query parameter on task read endpoints embeds data from other permission groups (task comments, reactions, time entry counts) without checking whether the token holds those scopes. A token scoped only to `tasks` read permissions can therefore read task comments and reactions it was explicitly not granted. ## Details `models.CanDoAPIRoute` (`pkg/models/api_routes.go`, ~line 440) authorises API tokens purely by comparing `method` and `c.Path()` against the routes stored for each granted permission group. The query string is never consulted. The task read endpoints accept `expand`: - `GET /api/v1/tasks/:task`, `GET /api/v1/tasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go` ReadOne/ReadAll, `pkg/models/task_collection.go`) - `GET /api/v2/tasks/:id`, `GET /api/v2/tasks`, `GET /api/v2/projects/:project/tasks` (`pkg/routes/api/v2/tasks.go`, `task_collection.go`) Accepted values include `comments`, `comment_count`, `reactions`, `time_entries_count`. `addMoreInfoToTasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go`, ~line 683) loads and embeds that data. At that layer only a `web.Auth` (the plain owner user, resolved by `auth.GetAuthFromClaims`) is available, so the token's scopes cannot be enforced there either. Result: the `tasks_comments`, `reactions`, and `time_entries` permission groups are advisory for any data reachable through a task expansion. ## Impact A holder of an API token scoped to `tasks: [read_one]` or `tasks: [read_
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.6.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-91983
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: API token scopes bypassed via task expand parameter (comments, reactions, time entry counts)
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:51 UTC
## Summary API token permission checks only match the HTTP method and route path. The `expand` query parameter on task read endpoints embeds data from other permission groups (task comments, reactions, time entry counts) without checking whether the token holds those scopes. A token scoped only to `tasks` read permissions can therefore read task comments and reactions it was explicitly not granted. ## Details `models.CanDoAPIRoute` (`pkg/models/api_routes.go`, ~line 440) authorises API tokens purely by comparing `method` and `c.Path()` against the routes stored for each granted permission group. The query string is never consulted. The task read endpoints accept `expand`: - `GET /api/v1/tasks/:task`, `GET /api/v1/tasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go` ReadOne/ReadAll, `pkg/models/task_collection.go`) - `GET /api/v2/tasks/:id`, `GET /api/v2/tasks`, `GET /api/v2/projects/:project/tasks` (`pkg/routes/api/v2/tasks.go`, `task_collection.go`) Accepted values include `comments`, `comment_count`, `reactions`, `time_entries_count`. `addMoreInfoToTasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go`, ~line 683) loads and embeds that data. At that layer only a `web.Auth` (the plain owner user, resolved by `auth.GetAuthFromClaims`) is available, so the token's scopes cannot be enforced there either. Result: the `tasks_comments`, `reactions`, and `time_entries` permission groups are advisory for any data reachable through a task expansion. ## Impact A holder of an API token scoped to `tasks: [read_one]` or `tasks: [read_
osv:GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.6.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "a2280ba68eb4201f0f50da45d0f2f1c2dbca44c880540505abf6c56eeac60f37",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: API token scopes bypassed via task expand parameter (comments, reactions, time entry counts)",
"summary": "## Summary API token permission checks only match the HTTP method and route path. The `expand` query parameter on task read endpoints embeds data from other permission groups (task comments, reactions, time entry counts) without checking whether the token holds those scopes. A token scoped only to `tasks` read permissions can therefore read task comments and reactions it was explicitly not granted. ## Details `models.CanDoAPIRoute` (`pkg/models/api_routes.go`, ~line 440) authorises API tokens purely by comparing `method` and `c.Path()` against the routes stored for each granted permission group. The query string is never consulted. The task read endpoints accept `expand`: - `GET /api/v1/tasks/:task`, `GET /api/v1/tasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go` ReadOne/ReadAll, `pkg/models/task_collection.go`) - `GET /api/v2/tasks/:id`, `GET /api/v2/tasks`, `GET /api/v2/projects/:project/tasks` (`pkg/routes/api/v2/tasks.go`, `task_collection.go`) Accepted values include `comments`, `comment_count`, `reactions`, `time_entries_count`. `addMoreInfoToTasks` (`pkg/models/tasks.go`, ~line 683) loads and embeds that data. At that layer only a `web.Auth` (the plain owner user, resolved by `auth.GetAuthFromClaims`) is available, so the token's scopes cannot be enforced there either. Result: the `tasks_comments`, `reactions`, and `time_entries` permission groups are advisory for any data reachable through a task expansion. ## Impact A holder of an API token scoped to `tasks: [read_one]` or `tasks: [read_",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.6.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91983",
"GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8",
"GO-2026-6726"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8/GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.5.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:16.622292055Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-9rg3-v78m-26q8",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91983",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/077dc4de79ce6f1ab59215a2c7bf9b30423685f2",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-api-token-scope-bypass-via-expand-parameter"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:52Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-91983",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376793,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:52+00:00"
}