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MediumFix available

pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents

Type: advisorySources: OSV2 source records

### Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to "ride" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: - `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc("Asset", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain reach

Products
pacioli-guard
Affected versions
0.9.6
Fixed versions
0.10.0
CVEs
CVE-2026-107841
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
30 Oct 2026, 18:15 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents

core-osv · Original source

Published 9 Oct 2026, 20:42 UTC

### Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to "ride" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: - `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc("Asset", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain reach

osv:GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4

pacioli-guard

Fixed versions: 0.10.0

Complete source record
{
  "id": "3d89e44e59803b2b155b2bd563c5d4e746c0a78c148832eaae3bafca5b4d98a7",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents",
    "summary": "### Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to \"ride\" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: - `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(\"Asset\", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain reach",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "pacioli-guard",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.10.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.9.6",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "severity": "medium",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-107841",
        "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
        "PYSEC-2026-4246"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.9.6"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.10.0"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "pacioli-guard",
            "purl": "pkg:pypi/pacioli-guard",
            "ecosystem": "PyPI"
          },
          "versions": [
            "0.9.6"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-15T14:55:55.450927331Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107841",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-863"
        ],
        "severity": "MODERATE",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-09T18:17:06Z",
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-107841",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 332684,
  "published_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:51+00:00"
}

pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents

core-osv · Original source

Published 15 Oct 2026, 10:22 UTC

### Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to "ride" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: - `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc("Asset", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain reach

osv:PYSEC-2026-4246

pacioli-guard

Fixed versions: 0.10.0

Complete source record
{
  "id": "e4af5611fc21925e9ffe99bda3742c470765743b90644433c7f50445aa7af2f3",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-4246",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents",
    "summary": "### Impact `pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to \"ride\" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own. The ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**. This is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled: - `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`). - That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(\"Asset\", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field. - The chain reach",
    "evidence": "osv:PYSEC-2026-4246",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "pacioli-guard",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.10.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.9.6",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "severity": "medium",
    "structured": {
      "id": "PYSEC-2026-4246",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-107841",
        "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
        "PYSEC-2026-4246"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.9.6"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.10.0"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "pacioli-guard",
            "purl": "pkg:pypi/pacioli-guard",
            "ecosystem": "PyPI"
          },
          "versions": [
            "0.9.6"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/pacioli-guard/PYSEC-2026-4246.yaml"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-15T14:45:12.948309515Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107841",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli",
        "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0",
        "https://pypi.org/project/pacioli-guard",
        "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
      ]
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-107841",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 332656,
  "published_at": "2026-10-15T10:22:55.058463+00:00"
}