Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
UnratedFix available

Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyed.

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Impact The RPC get_block_template fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC get_block_template will fail instead of dropping A. ## Patch First, the get_block_template should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain. ## Workaround Submit transaction B when A is already on chain. Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions: a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B. b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction. Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.

Products
ckb
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
0.40.0
CVEs
CVE-2021-45698
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
30 Oct 2026, 08:41 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyed.

core-osv · Original source

Published 25 Jul 2021, 12:00 UTC

## Impact The RPC get_block_template fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC get_block_template will fail instead of dropping A. ## Patch First, the get_block_template should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain. ## Workaround Submit transaction B when A is already on chain. Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions: a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B. b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction. Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.

osv:RUSTSEC-2021-0107

ckb

Fixed versions: 0.40.0

Complete source record
{
  "id": "bd7a442376320d22279c5632578e5dc9bf3e935511ebd876e2606c9fb8515f69",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2021-0107",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Miner fails to get block template when a cell used as a cell dep has been destroyed.",
    "summary": "## Impact The RPC get_block_template fails when a cell has been used as a cell dep and an input in the different transactions. Say cell C is used as a dep group in the transaction A, and is destroyed in the transaction B. The node adds transaction A first, then B into the transaction pool. They are both valid. But when generating the block template, if the fee rate of B is higher, it comes before A, which will invalidate A. Currently the RPC get_block_template will fail instead of dropping A. ## Patch First, the get_block_template should not fail but dropping the conflict transactions. Then we can propose solution to this issue. Here is an example. When a transaction is added to the pool, the pool must consider it depending on all the transactions which dep cell (direct or indirect via dep group) has been destroyed in this transaction. Because future transactions using the destroyed cells as dep will be rejected, the spending transaction only need to wait for all the existing dep transactions on chain. ## Workaround Submit transaction B when A is already on chain. Let B depend on A explicitly, there are several solutions: a. Add any output cell on A as a dep cell or input in B. b. Merge A and B. CKB allows using the same cell as both dep and input in the same transaction. Ensure the fee rate of B is less than A so A always has higher priority.",
    "evidence": "osv:RUSTSEC-2021-0107",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "ckb",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.40.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "unknown",
    "structured": {
      "id": "RUSTSEC-2021-0107",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2021-45698",
        "GHSA-8gjm-h3xj-mp6w",
        "GHSA-v666-6w97-pcwm",
        "RUSTSEC-2021-0107"
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.40.0"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "ckb",
            "purl": "pkg:cargo/ckb",
            "ecosystem": "crates.io"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "cvss": null,
            "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2021-0107.json",
            "categories": [],
            "informational": null
          },
          "ecosystem_specific": {
            "affects": {
              "os": [],
              "arch": [],
              "functions": []
            },
            "affected_functions": null
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-12T18:00:03.408852141Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://crates.io/crates/ckb",
        "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0107.html",
        "https://github.com/nervosnetwork/ckb/commit/e5b45795375d7dc2a689fb46790caca5c2653638"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "license": "CC0-1.0"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2021-45698",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": null
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 306330,
  "published_at": "2021-07-25T12:00:00+00:00"
}