Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)
## Summary The task-collection endpoint `GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks` loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a **link-share token**, the task query is correctly pinned to the share's own project, but the *view* is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to **any** project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant's kanban view and receive that view's bucket records — bucket titles plus the full `created_by` user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike. ## Details Root cause is in `TaskCollection.ReadAll` (`pkg/models/task_collection.go`). 1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check: ```go // pkg/models/task_collection.go (ReadAll) if tf.ProjectViewID != 0 { view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params) ... } ``` `GetProjectViewByIDAndProject` (`pkg/models/project_view.go`) filters only on `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` — it performs no authorization. A valid `(project, view)` pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns `ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist` (HTTP 404). 2. For a link-share caller, the code pins the *task* scope to the token's own
- Products
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.4.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-68582
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 9 Oct 2026, 20:42 UTC
## Summary The task-collection endpoint `GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks` loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a **link-share token**, the task query is correctly pinned to the share's own project, but the *view* is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to **any** project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant's kanban view and receive that view's bucket records — bucket titles plus the full `created_by` user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike. ## Details Root cause is in `TaskCollection.ReadAll` (`pkg/models/task_collection.go`). 1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check: ```go // pkg/models/task_collection.go (ReadAll) if tf.ProjectViewID != 0 { view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params) ... } ``` `GetProjectViewByIDAndProject` (`pkg/models/project_view.go`) filters only on `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` — it performs no authorization. A valid `(project, view)` pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns `ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist` (HTTP 404). 2. For a link-share caller, the code pins the *task* scope to the token's own
osv:GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c
code.vikunja.io/api
Fixed versions: 2.4.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "d70441a3145be9998fb3c4965086074e58408e1ac1985c34e4174d84645a4312",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)",
"summary": "## Summary The task-collection endpoint `GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks` loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a **link-share token**, the task query is correctly pinned to the share's own project, but the *view* is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to **any** project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant's kanban view and receive that view's bucket records — bucket titles plus the full `created_by` user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike. ## Details Root cause is in `TaskCollection.ReadAll` (`pkg/models/task_collection.go`). 1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check: ```go // pkg/models/task_collection.go (ReadAll) if tf.ProjectViewID != 0 { view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params) ... } ``` `GetProjectViewByIDAndProject` (`pkg/models/project_view.go`) filters only on `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` — it performs no authorization. A valid `(project, view)` pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns `ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist` (HTTP 404). 2. For a link-share caller, the code pins the *task* scope to the token's own",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.4.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "critical",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68582",
"GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
"GO-2026-6749"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V4",
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api",
"purl": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 2.3.0"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:41:11.703411636Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68582",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja",
"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0",
"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-broken-object-level-authorization-via-link-share-token"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:33Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-68582",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376782,
"published_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:33+00:00"
}