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Quasar Framework: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write via crafted Icon Genie profile

Type: advisorySources: OSV

## Vulnerability Details **File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile ` ### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile ` loads a JSON "profile" describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node's `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`. A profile setting `folder: "../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie"` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call. ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a "ready-made Icon

Products
@quasar/icongenie
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
6.1.1
CVEs
CVE-2026-106103
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
28 Oct 2026, 04:59 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Quasar Framework: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write via crafted Icon Genie profile

core-osv · Original source

Published 7 Oct 2026, 16:14 UTC

## Vulnerability Details **File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile ` ### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile ` loads a JSON "profile" describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node's `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`. A profile setting `folder: "../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie"` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call. ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a "ready-made Icon

osv:GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88

@quasar/icongenie

Fixed versions: 6.1.1

Complete source record
{
  "id": "4f55c7cc7a631761cd22b6b9bd85428ee64221c8cc5ea2616d24353f87113b1e",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Quasar Framework: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Write via crafted Icon Genie profile",
    "summary": "## Vulnerability Details **File**: `icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js` (line 35, `absoluteName: join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`) **Validation gap**: `icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js` (`assetsSchema`) — `folder`/`name` only checked with `Joi.string().required().min(1)`, no restriction on `..` sequences or absolute paths **Entry point**: `icongenie/lib/runner/generate.js` (`generate(argv)`) — `profile.assets = userProfile.assets`, loaded verbatim from a user-supplied JSON file via `--profile ` ### Root Cause `icongenie generate --profile ` loads a JSON \"profile\" describing icon/splashscreen assets to generate, where each asset entry has a `folder`/`name` describing where the generated file should be written relative to the Quasar project directory (`appDir`). `getAssetsFiles()` builds the write target with `join(appDir, asset.folder, asset.name)`. Node's `path.join` normalizes `..` segments arithmetically and does not clamp the result to stay inside `appDir`. The only validation before this (`validateProfileObject` → Joi `assetsSchema`) checks that `folder`/`name` are non-empty strings, with no `..` rejection and no containment check against `appDir`. A profile setting `folder: \"../../../../../../tmp/pwned-by-icongenie\"` sails through validation unmodified, and the generator writes attacker-influenced icon/splashscreen content to that path via a direct `writeFile`/`sharp().toFile()` call. ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker publishes a \"ready-made Icon ",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "@quasar/icongenie",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "6.1.1",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-106103",
        "GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "SEMVER",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "6.1.1"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "@quasar/icongenie",
            "purl": "pkg:npm/%40quasar/icongenie",
            "ecosystem": "npm"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88/GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-07T16:30:04.720529512Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/quasarframework/quasar/security/advisories/GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106103",
        "https://github.com/quasarframework/quasar/commit/87c89a80ec84f1eb7dbe258e5367161b0598ceb3",
        "https://github.com/quasarframework/quasar",
        "https://github.com/quasarframework/quasar/releases/tag/@quasar/icongenie-v6.1.1"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-22",
          "CWE-73"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T18:16:51Z",
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T16:14:14Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-106103",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 95152,
  "published_at": "2026-10-07T16:14:14+00:00"
}