Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name
### Summary A cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse. ### Details **Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`: ```ts private visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string { const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : []; const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(", ")})`; // <-- node.name concatenated RAW ... } ``` `node.name` is emitted directly into the SQL with **no allowlist check and no identifier escaping**. This is the only place in the compiler where an attacker-influenced identifier reaches the output unguarded: - The normal function-call path `visitCall` (`printer.ts:2951`) throws `Unknown function` f
- Products
- trigger.dev
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 4.5.6
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-114081
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 2 Oct 2026, 22:42 UTC
### Summary A cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse. ### Details **Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`: ```ts private visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string { const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : []; const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(", ")})`; // <-- node.name concatenated RAW ... } ``` `node.name` is emitted directly into the SQL with **no allowlist check and no identifier escaping**. This is the only place in the compiler where an attacker-influenced identifier reaches the output unguarded: - The normal function-call path `visitCall` (`printer.ts:2951`) throws `Unknown function` f
osv:GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw
trigger.dev
Fixed versions: 4.5.6
Complete source record
{
"id": "c85bc01db345e75407ab0fd9184ddc722243398c86051e73d6b0f4af662978e2",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name",
"summary": "### Summary A cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse. ### Details **Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`: ```ts private visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string { const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : []; const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(\", \")})`; // <-- node.name concatenated RAW ... } ``` `node.name` is emitted directly into the SQL with **no allowlist check and no identifier escaping**. This is the only place in the compiler where an attacker-influenced identifier reaches the output unguarded: - The normal function-call path `visitCall` (`printer.ts:2951`) throws `Unknown function` f",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "trigger.dev",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "4.5.6",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114081",
"GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.6"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "trigger.dev",
"purl": "pkg:npm/trigger.dev",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw.json",
"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 4.5.5"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:24.849977819Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev",
"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-89"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:42:20Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-114081",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 392978,
"published_at": "2026-10-02T22:42:20+00:00"
}