Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enfor
- Products
- Apache Kafka
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-110952
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 1 Nov 2026, 17:45 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default
core-cve · Original sourcePublished 28 Oct 2026, 16:37 UTC
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enfor
cve:CVE-2026-110952
Apache Kafka
Fixed versions: Not specified
Complete source record
{
"id": "0697acf98d1e999fe209828bdecb87d923eb653b88c1009dc9f9a432dd223a36",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-110952",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default",
"summary": "A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured: - The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it. - An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.) Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0). Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enfor",
"evidence": "cve:CVE-2026-110952",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "Apache Kafka",
"evidence": "/containers/cna/affected/0/product"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "unknown",
"structured": {
"id": "CVE-2026-110952",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-110952"
],
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"type": "Textual description of severity",
"content": {
"text": "moderate"
}
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"affected": [
{
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"product": "Apache Kafka",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.1.0",
"lessThan": "4.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
],
"packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.kafka/kafka",
"packageName": "org.apache.kafka:kafka",
"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected"
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-28T16:37:34.723Z",
"provider": "cve",
"references": [
"https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cna": {
"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
"shortName": "apache",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T16:37:34.723Z"
}
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-110952",
"evidence": "/cveMetadata/cveId"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": null
},
"source_id": "core-cve",
"document_id": 461085,
"published_at": "2026-10-28T16:37:34.723+00:00"
}