KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication
## Summary A namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `["*"]/["*"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token satisfies by construction. The destination field `hashiCorpVault.address` is unvalidated. Finder credits: Artem Cherezov @cherez0ff, with Claude Opus 4.8 ## Verified live kind v1.31.2, kedacore/keda v2.20.0 (latest at the time of audit, ) installed from the unmodified release manifest `keda-2.20.0.yam
- Products
- github.com/kedacore/keda, github.com/kedacore/keda/v2
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.21.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-77524
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 08:43 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 15 Oct 2026, 20:19 UTC
## Summary A namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `["*"]/["*"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token satisfies by construction. The destination field `hashiCorpVault.address` is unvalidated. Finder credits: Artem Cherezov @cherez0ff, with Claude Opus 4.8 ## Verified live kind v1.31.2, kedacore/keda v2.20.0 (latest at the time of audit, ) installed from the unmodified release manifest `keda-2.20.0.yam
osv:GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm
github.com/kedacore/keda
Fixed versions: Not specified
github.com/kedacore/keda/v2
Fixed versions: 2.21.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "62acf3f803b16c46f7f5c16026ad66a89d0d5c42e5bd407321bd2be3a756f93a",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication",
"summary": "## Summary A namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token satisfies by construction. The destination field `hashiCorpVault.address` is unvalidated. Finder credits: Artem Cherezov @cherez0ff, with Claude Opus 4.8 ## Verified live kind v1.31.2, kedacore/keda v2.20.0 (latest at the time of audit, ) installed from the unmodified release manifest `keda-2.20.0.yam",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "github.com/kedacore/keda",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
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"affected_versions": []
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{
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"evidence": "/affected/1/ranges"
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}
],
"severity": "critical",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77524",
"GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm",
"GO-2026-6776"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
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"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
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{
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],
"package": {
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"purl": "pkg:golang/github.com/kedacore/keda",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm.json"
}
},
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.0"
}
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}
],
"package": {
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"purl": "pkg:golang/github.com/kedacore/keda/v2",
"ecosystem": "Go"
},
"database_specific": {
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}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-19T21:40:44.489356801Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/kedacore/keda/security/advisories/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77524",
"https://github.com/kedacore/keda/commit/1e21cc798dedd079e696cdb45388eddc5e18365d",
"https://github.com/kedacore/keda",
"https://github.com/kedacore/keda/releases/tag/v2.21.0"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-918"
],
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T17:19:11Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:19:42Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-77524",
"evidence": "/aliases"
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"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 376732,
"published_at": "2026-10-15T20:19:42+00:00"
}