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3Dviewer-Nextcloud: Share password not enforced when streaming 3D models from a public link share

Type: advisorySources: Official CVE List

The 3D Viewer for Nextcloud is a comprehensive 3D model viewer application for Nextcloud that supports multiple 3D file formats. In versions 1.7.9 through 3.3.1, the app's public file endpoint performed no share authorization. Anyone who knows a share token could read the shared file's contents even when the link share was protected by a password. `PublicFileController` extended `OCP\AppFramework\Controller` and marked its routes `#[PublicPage]`. Nextcloud only enforces share passwords through `PublicShareMiddleware`, which returns early for any controller that is not an `OCP\AppFramework\PublicShareController` instance — so no password, expiry, or share-type check ran for these routes. `ShareFileService::loadLinkShare()` compounded this by treating any token that `getShareByToken()` matched as authorised. A share token is the part of the URL that people paste into chats, emails, and tickets. Password protection exists precisely for the case where holding the token should not by itself grant access, and that guarantee did not hold. Requests to `GET /ocs/v2.php/apps/threedviewer/public/file/{token}/{fileId}` returned `200` with the full file body for password-protected shares, with no password and no session. Nextcloud's own share page correctly redirected such requests to the password prompt. Scope is limited to files in the formats this app handles (STL, GLB/glTF, OBJ, STEP, IFC, and the other supported 3D types). Non-3D files in the same share are unaffected. Expired shares

Products
3Dviewer-Nextcloud
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
Not specified
CVEs
CVE-2026-104189
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:32 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

3Dviewer-Nextcloud: Share password not enforced when streaming 3D models from a public link share

core-cve · Original source

Published 27 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC

The 3D Viewer for Nextcloud is a comprehensive 3D model viewer application for Nextcloud that supports multiple 3D file formats. In versions 1.7.9 through 3.3.1, the app's public file endpoint performed no share authorization. Anyone who knows a share token could read the shared file's contents even when the link share was protected by a password. `PublicFileController` extended `OCP\AppFramework\Controller` and marked its routes `#[PublicPage]`. Nextcloud only enforces share passwords through `PublicShareMiddleware`, which returns early for any controller that is not an `OCP\AppFramework\PublicShareController` instance — so no password, expiry, or share-type check ran for these routes. `ShareFileService::loadLinkShare()` compounded this by treating any token that `getShareByToken()` matched as authorised. A share token is the part of the URL that people paste into chats, emails, and tickets. Password protection exists precisely for the case where holding the token should not by itself grant access, and that guarantee did not hold. Requests to `GET /ocs/v2.php/apps/threedviewer/public/file/{token}/{fileId}` returned `200` with the full file body for password-protected shares, with no password and no session. Nextcloud's own share page correctly redirected such requests to the password prompt. Scope is limited to files in the formats this app handles (STL, GLB/glTF, OBJ, STEP, IFC, and the other supported 3D types). Non-3D files in the same share are unaffected. Expired shares

cve:CVE-2026-104189

3Dviewer-Nextcloud

Fixed versions: Not specified

Complete source record
{
  "id": "d56021200ddbe1bc278a3d6ab250fe61c5809631f57ba6922577dbd8a434890d",
  "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104189",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "3Dviewer-Nextcloud: Share password not enforced when streaming 3D models from a public link share",
    "summary": "The 3D Viewer for Nextcloud is a comprehensive 3D model viewer application for Nextcloud that supports multiple 3D file formats. In versions 1.7.9 through 3.3.1, the app's public file endpoint performed no share authorization. Anyone who knows a share token could read the shared file's contents even when the link share was protected by a password. `PublicFileController` extended `OCP\\AppFramework\\Controller` and marked its routes `#[PublicPage]`. Nextcloud only enforces share passwords through `PublicShareMiddleware`, which returns early for any controller that is not an `OCP\\AppFramework\\PublicShareController` instance — so no password, expiry, or share-type check ran for these routes. `ShareFileService::loadLinkShare()` compounded this by treating any token that `getShareByToken()` matched as authorised. A share token is the part of the URL that people paste into chats, emails, and tickets. Password protection exists precisely for the case where holding the token should not by itself grant access, and that guarantee did not hold. Requests to `GET /ocs/v2.php/apps/threedviewer/public/file/{token}/{fileId}` returned `200` with the full file body for password-protected shares, with no password and no session. Nextcloud's own share page correctly redirected such requests to the password prompt. Scope is limited to files in the formats this app handles (STL, GLB/glTF, OBJ, STEP, IFC, and the other supported 3D types). Non-3D files in the same share are unaffected. Expired shares",
    "evidence": "cve:CVE-2026-104189",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "3Dviewer-Nextcloud",
          "evidence": "/containers/cna/affected/0/product"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "CVE-2026-104189",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-104189"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "version": "3.1",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "maz1987in",
          "product": "3Dviewer-Nextcloud",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": ">= 1.7.9, < 3.3.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-27T15:22:14.210Z",
      "provider": "cve",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud/security/advisories/GHSA-gjh8-x4wm-3cfj",
        "https://github.com/maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud/commit/1b0ca86ff9a96b4e045cb379bc8b8c2fe05f2fae",
        "https://github.com/maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud/commit/2cfef0326afc56112b948b3fdf7e5c873fab4104",
        "https://github.com/maz1987in/3Dviewer-Nextcloud/releases/tag/v3.3.2"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cna": {
          "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
          "shortName": "GitHub_M",
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-27T15:22:14.210Z"
        }
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-104189",
        "evidence": "/cveMetadata/cveId"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/containers/cna/metrics"
  },
  "source_id": "core-cve",
  "document_id": 394414,
  "published_at": "2026-10-27T15:22:14.21+00:00"
}