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namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE

Type: advisorySources: OSV

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a user namespace first. The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare() does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing that was covered gets revealed. create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content is right there in the new mount namespace: # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS); open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDON

Products
Kernel
Affected versions
Not specified
Fixed versions
7.2.11
CVEs
CVE-2026-98988
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
3 Nov 2026, 23:18 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE

core-osv · Original source

Published 23 Oct 2026, 12:20 UTC

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a user namespace first. The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare() does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing that was covered gets revealed. create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content is right there in the new mount namespace: # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS); open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDON

osv:CVE-2026-98988

Kernel

Fixed versions: 7.2.11

Complete source record
{
  "id": "6e7c23cac3cabac7b08a65bed597f150a7b027af5e3c8fcf052e0f478775616a",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-98988",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE",
    "summary": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a user namespace first. The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare() does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing that was covered gets revealed. create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content is right there in the new mount namespace: # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, \"/tmp/otn\", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS); open(\"/covered/under.txt\", O_RDON",
    "evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-98988",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "Kernel",
          "evidence": "/affected/1/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "7.2.11",
            "evidence": "/affected/1/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": []
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "CVE-2026-98988",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-98988"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
              "type": "GIT",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-98988.json"
          }
        },
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "7.0.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "7.2.11"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "Kernel",
            "ecosystem": "Linux"
          },
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-98988.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:32.137072646Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a",
        "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10",
        "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/98xxx/CVE-2026-98988.json",
        "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98988",
        "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cna_assigner": "Linux",
        "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/98xxx/CVE-2026-98988.json"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-98988",
        "evidence": "/id"
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    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 499239,
  "published_at": "2026-10-23T12:20:07.483+00:00"
}