Skip to content
Heist/ feed
Back to feed
HighFix available

Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files

Type: advisorySources: OSV

### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding "Steps to observe" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad

Products
vibe-trading-ai
Affected versions
0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.4, 0.1.5, 0.1.6
Fixed versions
0.1.7
CVEs
CVE-2026-114106
Confirmed fixed CVEs
Not specified
Updated in this feed
31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1

Source evidence

Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files

core-osv · Original source

Published 2 Oct 2026, 22:44 UTC

### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding "Steps to observe" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad

osv:GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f

vibe-trading-ai

Fixed versions: 0.1.7

Complete source record
{
  "id": "2d80ef499f9c3027e2746e83a75a66dea42d07892f411719ddfd784319270a13",
  "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
  "method": "structured",
  "payload": {
    "kind": "advisory",
    "title": "Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files",
    "summary": "### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding \"Steps to observe\" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad",
    "evidence": "osv:GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
    "products": [
      {
        "name": {
          "value": "vibe-trading-ai",
          "evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
        },
        "prerequisites": [],
        "fixed_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.1.7",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
          }
        ],
        "affected_versions": [
          {
            "value": "0.1.0",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.1",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.2",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.3",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.4",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.5",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          },
          {
            "value": "0.1.6",
            "evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "severity": "high",
    "structured": {
      "id": "GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2026-114106",
        "GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f"
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "type": "CVSS_V3",
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
        }
      ],
      "affected": [
        {
          "ranges": [
            {
              "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
              "events": [
                {
                  "introduced": "0.1.0"
                },
                {
                  "fixed": "0.1.7"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "package": {
            "name": "vibe-trading-ai",
            "purl": "pkg:pypi/vibe-trading-ai",
            "ecosystem": "PyPI"
          },
          "versions": [
            "0.1.0",
            "0.1.1",
            "0.1.2",
            "0.1.3",
            "0.1.4",
            "0.1.5",
            "0.1.6"
          ],
          "database_specific": {
            "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f.json"
          }
        }
      ],
      "modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:24.141394826Z",
      "provider": "osv",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/security/advisories/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/commit/9454d4a27a763b80e1d6eb5763b86c88e9e4e714",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading",
        "https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
      ],
      "provider_metadata": {
        "cwe_ids": [
          "CWE-200",
          "CWE-22",
          "CWE-23",
          "CWE-552"
        ],
        "severity": "HIGH",
        "github_reviewed": true,
        "nvd_published_at": null,
        "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:12Z"
      }
    },
    "related_cves": [
      {
        "value": "CVE-2026-114106",
        "evidence": "/aliases"
      }
    ],
    "security_relevant": true,
    "severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
  },
  "source_id": "core-osv",
  "document_id": 392979,
  "published_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:12+00:00"
}