Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files
### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding "Steps to observe" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad
- Products
- vibe-trading-ai
- Affected versions
- 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2, 0.1.3, 0.1.4, 0.1.5, 0.1.6
- Fixed versions
- 0.1.7
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-114106
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 14:08 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 2 Oct 2026, 22:44 UTC
### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding "Steps to observe" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad
osv:GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f
vibe-trading-ai
Fixed versions: 0.1.7
Complete source record
{
"id": "2d80ef499f9c3027e2746e83a75a66dea42d07892f411719ddfd784319270a13",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Vibe-Trading file-read tools expose arbitrary server-readable files",
"summary": "### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding \"Steps to observe\" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the ad",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "vibe-trading-ai",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "0.1.7",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": [
{
"value": "0.1.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.1",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.2",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.3",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.4",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.5",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
},
{
"value": "0.1.6",
"evidence": "/affected/0/versions"
}
]
}
],
"severity": "high",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114106",
"GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.7"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "vibe-trading-ai",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/vibe-trading-ai",
"ecosystem": "PyPI"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.3",
"0.1.4",
"0.1.5",
"0.1.6"
],
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-21T10:57:24.141394826Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/security/advisories/GHSA-5rmq-chc7-m22f",
"https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/commit/9454d4a27a763b80e1d6eb5763b86c88e9e4e714",
"https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading",
"https://github.com/HKUDS/Vibe-Trading/releases/tag/v0.1.7"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23",
"CWE-552"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:12Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-114106",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/database_specific/severity"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 392979,
"published_at": "2026-10-02T22:44:12+00:00"
}