Apache bRPC: Null pointer dereference in MySQL reply parser leading to client crash
The MySQL client response parser in Apache bRPC dereferences a null pointer when the server peer sends a zero-payload-length response packet. A response packet whose declared payload length is zero is accepted by the frame-length check (is_full_package), after which the parser reads the response type byte via an unbounded 5-byte fetch that returns nullptr, and type = p[4] dereferences it, crashing the client process. Root Cause: In brpc::policy::MysqlReply::ConsumePartialIOBuf, buf.fetch(header, 5) returns nullptr when the buffered data only holds the 4-byte header of a zero-length packet, then the code reads p[4] (and, in the fast-auth path, p2[4]) without checking for a null or zero-length packet. Affected Scenarios: A brpc MySQL client connecting to a malicious or compromised MySQL server (or a MITM) can be crashed by a zero-length server response packet, resulting in denial of service of the client. Fix: The fix rejects zero-length response packets (returning PARSE_ERROR_ABSOLUTELY_WRONG) both for the initial response type determination and after a fast-auth marker, before reading the type byte. Upgrade to the Apache bRPC version 1.18.0 or apply the PR patch at https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3536.
- Products
- Not specified
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- Not specified
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-90484
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 6 Nov 2026, 02:44 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
Apache bRPC: Null pointer dereference in MySQL reply parser leading to client crash
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 21 Oct 2026, 12:19 UTC
The MySQL client response parser in Apache bRPC dereferences a null pointer when the server peer sends a zero-payload-length response packet. A response packet whose declared payload length is zero is accepted by the frame-length check (is_full_package), after which the parser reads the response type byte via an unbounded 5-byte fetch that returns nullptr, and type = p[4] dereferences it, crashing the client process. Root Cause: In brpc::policy::MysqlReply::ConsumePartialIOBuf, buf.fetch(header, 5) returns nullptr when the buffered data only holds the 4-byte header of a zero-length packet, then the code reads p[4] (and, in the fast-auth path, p2[4]) without checking for a null or zero-length packet. Affected Scenarios: A brpc MySQL client connecting to a malicious or compromised MySQL server (or a MITM) can be crashed by a zero-length server response packet, resulting in denial of service of the client. Fix: The fix rejects zero-length response packets (returning PARSE_ERROR_ABSOLUTELY_WRONG) both for the initial response type determination and after a fast-auth marker, before reading the type byte. Upgrade to the Apache bRPC version 1.18.0 or apply the PR patch at https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3536.
osv:CVE-2026-90484
Complete source record
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"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-90484",
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"kind": "advisory",
"title": "Apache bRPC: Null pointer dereference in MySQL reply parser leading to client crash",
"summary": "The MySQL client response parser in Apache bRPC dereferences a null pointer when the server peer sends a zero-payload-length response packet. A response packet whose declared payload length is zero is accepted by the frame-length check (is_full_package), after which the parser reads the response type byte via an unbounded 5-byte fetch that returns nullptr, and type = p[4] dereferences it, crashing the client process. Root Cause: In brpc::policy::MysqlReply::ConsumePartialIOBuf, buf.fetch(header, 5) returns nullptr when the buffered data only holds the 4-byte header of a zero-length packet, then the code reads p[4] (and, in the fast-auth path, p2[4]) without checking for a null or zero-length packet. Affected Scenarios: A brpc MySQL client connecting to a malicious or compromised MySQL server (or a MITM) can be crashed by a zero-length server response packet, resulting in denial of service of the client. Fix: The fix rejects zero-length response packets (returning PARSE_ERROR_ABSOLUTELY_WRONG) both for the initial response type determination and after a fast-auth marker, before reading the type byte. Upgrade to the Apache bRPC version 1.18.0 or apply the PR patch at https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3536.",
"evidence": "osv:CVE-2026-90484",
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"modified": "2026-10-28T02:30:46.218259661Z",
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"references": [
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"https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90484",
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"published_at": "2026-10-21T12:19:37.796+00:00"
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