ApostropheCMS: Incomplete CVE-2026-53606: `meta http-equiv=refresh` `content` still ships `javascript:` / `data:` URLs
### Summary CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked. Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`. On **2.17.7**: ```text sanitizeHtml( '', { allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } } ) // => ``` `data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction="javascript:…"` (53606) is stripped. Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`). ### Details `naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport). **Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref('meta', url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone. ### PoC Local `sanitize-html@2.17.7`. Output inspection only: ```text node -e ' const sanitize = require("sanitize-html"); const opts = { allowedTags:
- Products
- sanitize-html
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 2.18.0
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-113661
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 31 Oct 2026, 13:14 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
ApostropheCMS: Incomplete CVE-2026-53606: `meta http-equiv=refresh` `content` still ships `javascript:` / `data:` URLs
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 20 Oct 2026, 18:15 UTC
### Summary CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked. Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`. On **2.17.7**: ```text sanitizeHtml( '', { allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } } ) // => ``` `data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction="javascript:…"` (53606) is stripped. Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`). ### Details `naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport). **Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref('meta', url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone. ### PoC Local `sanitize-html@2.17.7`. Output inspection only: ```text node -e ' const sanitize = require("sanitize-html"); const opts = { allowedTags:
osv:GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j
sanitize-html
Fixed versions: 2.18.0
Complete source record
{
"id": "d480664078e6e7289c6c507d02ad965bbc0aa82f056f4ef521c53da73e15cc00",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j",
"method": "structured",
"payload": {
"kind": "advisory",
"title": "ApostropheCMS: Incomplete CVE-2026-53606: `meta http-equiv=refresh` `content` still ships `javascript:` / `data:` URLs",
"summary": "### Summary CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked. Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`. On **2.17.7**: ```text sanitizeHtml( '', { allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } } ) // => ``` `data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction=\"javascript:…\"` (53606) is stripped. Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`). ### Details `naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport). **Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref('meta', url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone. ### PoC Local `sanitize-html@2.17.7`. Output inspection only: ```text node -e ' const sanitize = require(\"sanitize-html\"); const opts = { allowedTags: ",
"evidence": "osv:GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j",
"products": [
{
"name": {
"value": "sanitize-html",
"evidence": "/affected/0/package/name"
},
"prerequisites": [],
"fixed_versions": [
{
"value": "2.18.0",
"evidence": "/affected/0/ranges"
}
],
"affected_versions": []
}
],
"severity": "medium",
"structured": {
"id": "GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j",
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113661",
"GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j"
],
"metrics": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
}
],
"affected": [
{
"ranges": [
{
"type": "SEMVER",
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.0"
}
]
}
],
"package": {
"name": "sanitize-html",
"purl": "pkg:npm/sanitize-html",
"ecosystem": "npm"
},
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j.json"
}
}
],
"modified": "2026-10-20T18:30:03.592709324Z",
"provider": "osv",
"references": [
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe",
"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/sanitize-html@2.18.0"
],
"provider_metadata": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T18:15:33Z"
}
},
"related_cves": [
{
"value": "CVE-2026-113661",
"evidence": "/aliases"
}
],
"security_relevant": true,
"severity_evidence": "/severity/0/score"
},
"source_id": "core-osv",
"document_id": 390148,
"published_at": "2026-10-20T18:15:33+00:00"
}