exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten. Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop ->map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip ->page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone. The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.
- Products
- Kernel
- Affected versions
- Not specified
- Fixed versions
- 7.2.6
- CVEs
- CVE-2026-92487
- Confirmed fixed CVEs
- Not specified
- Updated in this feed
- 3 Nov 2026, 13:23 UTC · Revision 1
Source evidence
exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping
core-osv · Original sourcePublished 17 Sept 2026, 16:10 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten. Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop ->map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip ->page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone. The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.
osv:CVE-2026-92487
Kernel
Fixed versions: 7.2.6
Complete source record
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"title": "exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping",
"summary": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix valid_size extension over a shared writable mapping When a shared writable mapping has its valid_size extended by a buffered write or a page fault, exfat zeroes the page-cache gap below the new valid_size. A store through the mapping can race with this zeroing and be overwritten. Fix this by zeroing the gap lazily. Drop ->map_pages so that every first write fault goes through exfat_page_mkwrite(), which advances valid_size to cover the faulting page. With fault-around enabled, a store could install a writable PTE, skip ->page_mkwrite(), and land past valid_size without advancing it. Extending valid_size one faulting page at a time also leaves never-written pages in a large mapping alone. The gap is filled with block granularity, zeroing only the not-uptodate blocks and preserving blocks that may hold data stored through the mapping. On the buffered-write path the invalidate lock is held and the gap is unmapped before zeroing, so a racing store re-faults and, under the inode lock, completes only after the gap has been zeroed and valid_size covers it.",
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